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THE DURA LEX OF LEGALISM
AND THE FIRST EMPIRE
Estudlo En Honor Dei
Dr. Luis Recasens Siches
Sebastian d e Grazia

When a state is about to perish,
many new laws will be found in it.
—Commentary ofTso, Duke Chao, VI (536 B.C.)
I

In the matter of law China has had a history different
from that of Europe. "The people should fight for the
law as they would for the city walls," said Heraclitus.
The Chinese of the time would have been baffled by the
declaration.
In Confucius' day China had little statutory law or
legislation. Families, clans and villages worshipped,
worked, played and settled their own disputes by customary law or morality. Inheriting a rural culture from
the days of far antiquity, heads of families, clans and
villages knew the duties and privileges of persons according to age, sex, kinship, and station, and decided
matters by local custom and equity. They would try to
solve any controversy (one concerning goods, for
example) through arbitration, compromise, and pressure along all local, non-judicial channels before getting
involved with officials or magistrates.
The foundations of customary law were of course
built upon ancestor worship and other religious beliefs
that fascinating though they are need not be detailed
here. Civil procedure did exist but it was the criminal
penalties which, apart from the unwritten law of custom, characterized most of that which was called law in
China. Punishments to fit the crime along with the rules
for their application and mitigation under varying circumstances in military, treason, and criminal cases apPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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pear as early as the oldest parts of the Book of Documents, the ancient collection of kingly pronouncements, counsels and principles, some of which
go back prior to 1000 B.C. "Be careful and enlightened
in regard to your punishments," counsels King Wu (r.
1111-1104 B.C.), co-founder with King Wen of the
Chou Dynasty. "Having tried a case of arrest, reflect
upon it five or six days, nay even to ten or a season, and
then grandly decide the tried case of arrest."
The Book of Documents contains some of the most
fundamental political writings of China. In it the ancient
constitution—the basic documents enunciating the
source and support of authority, the distribution of
political power, the conditions of just rule, the obligations and privileges of subjects—is set forth as the pattern of "the active virtue of the ancients." Created
from the political theory of the great, early Chou rulers,
Wen, Wu, and the Duke of Chou (r. 1104-1067), it
proclaims a universal kingship deriving its just powers
from the universal T'ien (Heaven). When political
thought first appears in China, a king of the imperial
house would invest his dukes with a mandate to rule.
The king himself could rule only because he too had
received a mandate, the Mandate of T'ien. T'ien
granted the Mandate only to one king on earth, who
then became known as the Son of T'ien, a title equivalent to Emperor. As the Book of Documents puts it,
"The Son of T'ien is father and mother of the people
and thereby king over the whole world." The title does
not denote divine heredity. Rather, it describes how the
Emperor should act: to maintain the peace and harmony of T'ien's design as an obedient, true son would
do. And it prescribes one-man rule. Furthermore the
charge to rule is conditional. Should the emperor be
wicked, T'ien will withdraw the Mandate and wreak
ruin and destruction on his head. The Chinese did not
relinquish this theory of kingship until the twentieth
century.
1
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Confucius was the staunchest advocate of ancient
Chou institutions and together with later followers had
cannonized Chou literature. His words show a distrust
of statutory and written penal laws. The Master said,
"Govern the people by regulations, keep order among
them by chastisements, and they will flee from you, and
lose all self-respect" (Analects 2:3). The earliest written statutes seemed to have been inscribed on metal
sacrificial cauldrons. The Commentary ofTso, an exciting chronicle and great prose work covering events at
court, 722-468 B.C., reported that in 512 B.C. when
Confucius heard that the state of Chin was casting iron
tripods on which to cast the penal code, he was aghast.
"Chin is going to ruin," he said. " . . . People will
study the tripods and not care to honor their men of
rank." As the practice took hold, critics never tired of
pointing out that incising the laws would lead people to
respect engravings rather than men in authority and to
invoke the script of the law rather than its spirit.
In China around the fourth century B.C. a new school
arose—Fa-chia or School of Law, also referred to as
Legalism, and its adherents as Legalists. The core of
the school lies in two books, one the Book of Lord
Shang attributed to Shang Yang, the other, the Han Fei
Tzu written by Han Fei Tzu. The state in which both
had been advisors was Ch'in, an uncouth, partly Tatar
land far to the west, with a promising military future.
2

3

II
Legalism carried out what seems to have been an
important legal experiment. Its lifespan fell within the
fourth and third centuries, B.C. Its history ever since
has been colored by partisan reporting and the overlays
of time. The extent to which what the Legalists proposed was carried out cannot be told without uncertainty. Their explicit desire to change family law could
not be fullfilled without enacting and codifying new
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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inheritance and succession rules, and little is known of
this. It is not even certain within what limits King
Cheng, their ultimate ruler and later the First Emperor,
agreed with their ideas. In the days of the First Empire
at least, his dramatic politico-religious acts point to the
charismatic beginnings of emperor worship; a not infrequent occurrence when empires are born, but not
quite in keeping with the rational and secular jurisprudence of the Legalists. He also worked like a slave,
going through, it is said, one hundred and twenty
pounds of reports daily. The ideal Legalist ruler was to
let his ministers do the work ("Let roosters herald the
dawn. . ."); did he but read more than ten bamboo slips
of the law codes, he would fall asleep; he was to rest on
a couch, play the five-stringed guitar, and keep his
girlish complexion (Han Fei Tzu 2:18, 11:32).
Though the history of the influence and ideas of the
Legalists cannot always be spoken of with confidence,
at least what has been reported so far—even if later
discovered to be unfactual—raises questions of some
interest for students of law and political philosophy.
Recent years in modern China, moreover, have seen a
resurgence of interest in Legalism. The current disposition there for a revival of classical learning comes
from a new impulse: to learn as much as possible of the
progressive Legalist thinkers of the past who, because
of prejudice by conservative Confucians, have been
forced to lead an underground life for two thousand
years. Such is the present emphasis in the People's
Republic of China. The past is being used to fight the
past. Apparently the study of classical Chinese has
never been held in such esteem; at the same time the
pages of the newly revived Bulletin of Peking University reflect the dominating interest in Legalist thought.
This in itself might increase the incentive to study the
Legalists, but the purpose of the main part of this paper
is simply to offer a characterization of and brief commentary on the Legalist doctrine of harsh punishment. I
4
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rely chiefly on the Book of Lord Shang and the Han Fei
Tzu. While sometimes there arise in these works
statements that seem at odds with one or another of
their own views, I have tried to choose their most stable
positions. In the factual elements to go into his enterprise there is hardly anything new or controversial. In
the commentary, I shall be using varied concepts of
legal and political philosophy. In different parts of the
world, admittedly, they may not cover the same
phenomena. Even in Europe and America they would
not always match the phenomena exactly, and besides,
the concepts sometimes hold different meanings for
different scholars. So there are both cross-cultural and
analytic loosenesses to cope with; yet, I trust, the advantages of a loose fit here offer more than those of no
fit at all.
At the close of the paper I shall offer what amounts to
a few thoughts for further study in the larger perspective of the relation of Legalism to fundamental law. My
speculation is that in the process of their experiment,
the Legalists brought the country to the edge of a
transformation in fundamental law. They brought about
this crisis in law, curiously, in the name of a doctrine of
law and a demand for its supremacy.
The people of Ch'in where Legalism took root, were
on the periphery of Chinese culture. As the
anthropologically-minded Hsun Tzu, the great Confucian philosopher (c. 312-c. 238 B.C.) noted, they were
less observant of the Chinese emphasis on family property. They may have had other cultural differences too,
for they most certainly took a different stand on law.
Ill

The Legalists insisted on written statutory law, indifferent to the common welfare, interest, or good, free
of metaphysics (but positive and relative), opposed to
conventional morality and constitutional restraints,
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enacted on command of the ruler, proposed and clearly
and widely promulgated by his ministers, uniformly
applied without regard to family, status or region,
changed according to reason and science (essentially
the methods and results of social science research—
economic, statistical, administrative) and strictly enforced through irrevocable punishment that far exceeded the crime.
Their profession was that of advisors and ministers to
the ruler. Their rivals were the Confucians whose position was that of constitutional advocates. As an
ideological and occupational group the Legalists aimed
to supplant the Confucians as policy makers and to
strike at aristocratic privilege in the inheritance or assignment of government posts. Their proclaimed aim
was to submerge family, religious, regional and other
sentiment in a larger entity, a unified country or empire,
conquered by war and pacified under a universally supreme law. On this nationalistic or imperial basis rested
their deontology. They were sure that an able, ambitious and far-sighted ruler would want or need no other
deontology than raison d'etat.
In trying to understand Legalist thought it is of utmost importance to keep in mind that they were speaking and writing primarily for the ear and eye of the ruler.
They sided with him and his problems. They reasoned
with no other possibility in mind than one-man sovereignty. They had little interest in attracting the good will
of anyone but the ruler. To a secondary degree they
would in their writings be trying to unite the views of
like-minded persons, the experts spoken of previously.
They also wrote as if they believed their views were
irrefutable, and they probably did so believe; their social scientific methodology covered their statutes with
the mantle of reason for them, perhaps, even the ratio
legis. Altogether, then, their language is seldom enhanced with expressions of the common welfare, public
interest or good. On the contrary, to commoners they
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol4/iss4/4
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frankly offered little: a future order of unity and peace, a
present order of toil, war, threats and punishments. (Of
course they never expected commoners to read their
vade mecum for the king.)
In the course of several centuries Legalism developed a thorough-going philosophy of utilitarian deterrence based on rudiments of a hedonistic, behavioral
psychology. Punishment was to act as the deterrent of
the greatest number, perhaps of even 100%. "Take
seriously one culprit's crime and suppress all wickednesses within the boundaries," repeats Han Fei Tzu
(18:46). Through harsh, inflexible penalty, law was to
reign supreme. If law is supreme, the ruler is safely
ensconced, and order reigns—which, for people, is the
maximum social good. The Legalists' good of society is
not maximum individual happiness or self-assertion,
but social order.
Laws were to be binding not for love or authority of
the sovereign or for patriotism or the commonweal, not
because recognized or accepted as binding, not because
they met given ethical standards, nor because formal
requirements of enacting, promulgating and enforcement were satisfied, but solely because their violation
was to be punished swiftly, inevitably, uniformly, irrevocably and severely. Subjects are like babes in the
woods: they do not understand what the king and his
ministers are about with their various laws, punishments, labor drafts, taxes, and military service. Though
law and order benefit his subjects, the ruler should not
expect them to think of him or the state as anything but
the gunman writ large.
The Legalists set up a number of supporting posts for
their theory. First, one seemingly based on the acceptance of the principle that pain, while a physical evil to
the person, in the form of punishment becomes a relative evil. And punishment strictly, swiftly and inexorably executed will eventually result in less punishment
having to be applied and thus in this form is a relative
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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good. This is the Lord of Shang's meaning in saying,
"Virtue has its origin in force." The Legalists were not
much interested in virtue, though. Many crimes and
many punishments were bad because they were costly
financially and politically. Harsh punishment buys
compliance at a cheaper rate than lenient punishment or
other methods. Their medicine was force. Applied in
heavy doses to persons it had a homeopathic effect on
the country as a whole. "Therefore, if by war one
wishes to abolish war, even war is permissible; if by
killing one wants to abolish killing, even heavy punishments are permissible" {Book of Lord Shang 4:18).
Wishing won't make it so, of course, but if it could
make it so, the Legalist position would be hard to refute, without bringing in a postulate that they would not
admit, that harsh punishment is a mala in se. Their
relativist stance would forbid admitting that. "It is no
cruelty to enforce severe penalties" (Han Fei Tzu
19:49). Their postulate utilizes human quantities. To
punish a few harshly and have few crimes is better than
to punish many leniently and have many crimes.
Nor can another ethical question gain much headway
here: whether punishing a few persons harshly is not
selecting scapegoats or sacrificial victims. This objection would leave the Legalists untroubled. Individuals
and families may have to be sacrificed for the higher
ethical standard of raison d'etat.
In another sense one might object that the harshly
punished cannot be guilty of the extra punishment.
Being over-punished for a crime they did commit is like
being punished for a more serious crime they did not
commit. What did the Legalists mean by a "light"
crime, as in Lord Shang's phrase, "Punish light crime
severely?" They meant "light" not by their own but by
conventional standards. The Legalist argument would
be that in true perspective all criminals deserve more
punishment than they get.
Now this last remark about the just deserts of crimihttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol4/iss4/4

8

de Grazia: The Dura Lex of Legalism and the First Empire 67

nals does not seem to fit the view that the Legalists were
immoral or that they were trying to separate law from
ethics. Again, unless one insists on the same mala in se,
cruel punishment being an absolute evil, the view would
seem to be incorrect. The Legalists did not suppose or
ever concede that the ruler's aim in using cruel force
should be that of a tyrant, to win power or glory or
riches for himself. They presumed that his end was
theirs: a powerful state, capable of conquering others,
ending the wars between states, and uniting the country
into an empire.
It also seems clear that the Legalists were not trying
to separate law from ethics. At first blush this may not
seem to be the case for they disapproved of ethical
considerations in the enactment and enforcement of
law. Yet their moral judgments if not conventional were
fierce. Their ideal was the state. Criminals and all those
who preached and practiced traditional virtues like filial
piety, kindness, brotherly goodness, duty and love,
were "lice" to be kept off the body of the tough, healthy
state.
Here they may be charged with falling into inconsistency, but one almost characteristic of legal positivism.
If law is to be obeyed only because of fear of punishment, one cannot in the same breath also demand that it
be respected as valid for ethical superiority or moral
urgency. Han Fei Tzu called the frivolous and dissolute, "vermin," and intellectuals who beclouded the
law, "itinerant witches and priests." Through such
moral indignation and imperativeness, retributivism
stalks into the Legalist theory of utilitarian punishment.
The guilty must be punished, regardless of utility. Indeed, the Legalist position is super-maximalist: the
criminal must be overpunished; he cannot be punished
enough, for even the mildest wrongdoer is striking at
the state, newly discovered as the highest ethical ideal.
A second and more unusual support for their theory
rested on psychology. To punish people, you must do to
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980

9

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 4 [1980], No. 4, Art. 4
68

them what they hate; then they will be compliant. What
do they hate? Penalties, physical pain, death. In this
behavioral scheme, the way to increase obedience is to
raise punitive severity to one high plane. If there are no
small crimes, they further reasoned, there can be no big
crimes. At the lowest level of crime a kind of reflex to
criminality will be conditioned that as a matter of course
will operate also at the highest level. The advantage is
that the whole atmosphere of criminality which in itself
creates the environment for crime will thereby be eliminated.
The Legalists used their psychology not to define the
good or overall happiness of society but to theorize
about obedience or compliance with law. Punishment
was only one of "two handles," to use Han Fei Tzu's
phrase. The other was reward or praise. Whoever did
deeds of merit or valor was to receive land, or tax
exemption, or some form of commendation. One idea
was to confer distinction through promotion in a graded
system of honorary rank. This system later took hold
and became part of the Chinese political hierarchy
wherein one held an honorific as well as bureaucratic
rank, which would, the Legalists hoped, rival aristocratic title.
Technically, the two handles would give Legalists a
hedonistic psychology. In practice they put greater reliance on the handle of punishment. To parallel the rule,
"Punish light crime severely," they never said, "Reward small good deeds hugely." In fact the Book of
Lord Shang is not at all keen about giving prizes to
do-gooders. ". . . it is like giving rewards for not stealing" (4:18).
The Legalists pleasure-pain calculus calculated
largely on pain. States other than Ch'in used penalties
similar to theirs but nowhere with a shorter easy-hard
continuum, nowhere with so little chance of reprieve or
lightening of sentence, nowhere in such terrible variety.
To an already long Chinese list the Ch'in government in
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol4/iss4/4
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749 B.C. (according to the Historical Records (c. 100
B.C.) of the great historian, Ssu-ma Ch'ien) contributed
still another punishment (which Lord Shang recommends for lax magistrates)—extermination of one's
family to the third degree or generation, a punishment
not inconsistent of course with the ethics of utilitarian
deterrence.
In their novel theory of eliminating the environment
of crime by harsh punishment, the element of
passionate crime (crime for love or honor or whatever
motive that overrides all penalties) seems to have been
overlooked. Yet annals of the period abound in such
crime. The stimulus-response theory, of course, would
have to overlook this idea because, theoretically, in its
system, all traits or acts, or propensities toward such,
could be extinguished by negative stimuli. Putting the
resemblance to a simple S-R scheme aside for the moment, one can see instead two different hypotheses of
characteristic human response or human nature: man
the calculating actor vs. man the passionate actor. But
once admit passionate crime into the legalist system,
the possibility arises that harsh punishment may eliminate routine or calculated crime and leave only
passionate crime—which of course may include crimes
against the state. The things men hate beyond calculation (or beyond negative stimuli) have been known to
include insult or mortification, sexual attraction, injury
to family or loved ones, and—injustice.
A further objection to this theory implicates the
ethics of fitting the punishment to the crime. For the
Legalists, drawing further on their elementary stimulus-response psychology, concluded that punishment
to fit the crime was unavailing. Punishment for even the
smallest offense should be cruel. Though punishment
may be various, it should all be on the one high plateau
of harshness or cruelty. The lex talionis, though in
intent perhaps more retributive than utilitarian, still
contains a primitive positive correlation of crime and
5
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punishment. In their insistence on harsh punishment as
a deterrent, the Legalists undoubtedly would not have
settled for "two eyes for an eye." They never seemed
to have considered that one may as well be hanged for a
wolf as for a sheep, that if a man is to die for a small
crime, why not for a big one? Theoretically the proposition breaks down: a steep rise in penalty for small
crime increases the incentive to major crime. If the
punishment exceeds the crime, then the crime will rise
to fit the punishment.
Something like this last rule may have played a part in
the turbulence that led to the overthrow of the First
Empire.
After these few pages of comment it may be evident:
a more unrelenting opposition than Legalism to the
by-then almost fully developed Confucian synthesis
would be hard to find or imagine. The Legalist was
interested in obedience, the Confucian, in obligation. In
government the basic Confucian question was not as it
was for the Legalist, How do you (ruler and ministers)
get people to do what you want? but, How do you (ruler
and constitutional advocates) get people to see what is
good or good for them?
The Confucian answer was through example, persuasion, politico-religious rites, ceremonies and music,
education, and at last resort, penalties. The "law" conceived almost exclusively as penal law was not a favorite term. Confucian doctrine relied on traditional
and customary law (which of course as in other parts of
the world where such norms guide conduct were not the
terms used to designate them). Ancestral and family law
was above raison d'etat. Being unfilial or unbrotherly
was worse than being a thief or murderer, even worse
than being a traitor. The family writ large permeated
political, legal, and religious structures and observances. The source of authority or Grundnorm of the
law was the politico-religious Mandate of T'ien. The
ruler, the Son of T'ien, was charged by T'ien to have the
6
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care of the community. As in natural law, his ordinances must be directed toward the welfare of that
community. Otherwise his ordinances are not law, nor
having lost the Mandate is he any longer the Son of
T'ien, the legitimate ruler. "If there is any fault, T'ien
will punish and kill me". In the working out of justice,
his rulings were law, subject to the restraints of the
norms of T'ien, "the norms given by T'ien to our people" and the constitutional law embodied in Chou literature as extracted, preserved, ordered and interpreted by Confucians. The Emperor's law was accordingly particularistic, hierarchical, ad hoc, directed to
the common welfare, maintained and transmitted rather
than enacted, and clear not because written and promulgated, but because securely imbedded in ritual and
timeless tradition.
7

IV
Legalism it is said is the doctrine on which the Ch'in
state battened to form the First Chinese Empire. If so,
its achievements were many and great. Winning and
administering a huge state called for a vast communications network, the standardization of writing, weights
and measures, and a measure of uniformity in bureaucratic methods. The Legalists discovered the possibilities of administration; they grasped the importance
of written law, its clear promulgation and impartial
execution; they glimpsed the need for a separate judiciary, for codification of accumulated precedent, and
the growth of jurisprudence. They saw, too, that legislation should fit changing conditions, and brought to
light a legal and political realism and social science.
They ripped at feudalistic government to make way for
an empire-wide military and civil administration. The
founding of the First Empire was a major event in world
history. It was the first time the idea of unity'' within the
Wall'' had been realized. Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, the First
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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Emperor, had finished the Great Wall. It differentiated
those outside the wall as barbarians, beyond the pale.
And the Ch'in, in the awe with which people across
Asia spoke of their achievements, probably lent their
name to the country that has ever since been called
China.
These achievements are not necessarily those of law
or jurisprudence. Nor are all the tenets of Legalism
those of law (fa). Administrative methods (shu) and
power handling (shih) also pay notable roles, however
subordinate as concepts. The stunning achievements
of Ch'in undoubtedly helped support its law, however.
Military victories would have given the state prestige
and in a non sequitur added to its laws a luster that in
turn began to create a habit of obedience apart from the
threat of legal force.
Apparently by 210 B.C. when after 36 years on the
throne the First Emperor died, the habit of obedience
was still not fully acquired. Revolt broke out in all
provinces. The Legalist machinery of law and administration collapsed. Hsiin Tzu who had been the teacher
of both Han Fei Tzu and Li Ssu (chief architect of
Legalist practice in Ch'in and the First Empire) had
pointed out that good laws without good men will not
avail. The Empire the Emperor had struggled to make
last for ten thousand generations had lasted two decades. His name became synonymous with monster,
his law synonymous with terror.
Clearly the Legalists were trying to make the shift
from customary to written law. Still, other sovereign
political units have grown from smaller to larger size,
other countries and embryonic empires have absorbed
customary and written law without suffering so evil a
reputation and such enduring trauma.
The Legalist attack was more than this. It was two
pronged, one against unwritten customary law, the
other against the constitution. There is no difficulty in
identifying the second target as the Confucian constitu8
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tion. The Legalists themselves acknowledge its persistence in their strikes at it. In the back of their minds they
did have a new constitution, but they found difficulty in
advocating it openly. They were at a disadvantage.
They had rejected the family and aristocratic morality
of the Mandate of T'ien. (They must have thought it
moribund, anyway: in practice the rulers of states paid
it small heed.) What would they exchange for it? They
could not use the old constitution; nor flushed with
military and political triumphs did they—until too
late—suspect that they needed a source for constitutional authority.
In the preceding pages of comparison between Confucian and Legalist law, something is lacking. No mention was made of the Legalists' source of authority or
basic norm of the system of law and the constitution.
They seemed to have no clear position on it. The realization that old authority may be gone is but one side of
reality. Another is that new authority—embodying the
terms and justification of rulership, defining and supporting law, legitimacy, sovereignty, succession, and a
host of other political necessities—urgently awaits creation. This, it seems, the Legalists never fully grasped.
The ruling house of Ch'in had but distant and dubious
claims to be related to T'ien. Moreover, it had itself no
powerful new gods to supplant or syncretize with T'ien.
(Such an approach might have been foreign to the Legalist secular outlook, in any case.) And the Legalists
never dreamed of opening up the democratic possibilities in uniformly applied law into a blooming doctrine of the people as the source of authority.
Unable themselves to build a new foundation for
obedience to law, believing that ordinary men no longer
lived if ever they did by the old morality, that the lords
of states no longer observed if ever they did the old
rites, what then to the Legalists was obligation but what
you could count on getting men to do by force or its
threat? Despairing of men, they grew addicted to
9
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punishment, the greater the despair, the harsher the
punishment.
What the Legalists had to try to do was to change the
constitution from religiously limited monarchy to absolutism. They may have much preferred a legally limited monarchy, but they never said so. Though they
spoke of the supremacy of law, they never dared say it
was above the ruler. At most, they held, the ruler
should leave law to the jurists and not change it often or
capriciously. At most, the ruler needed their kind of
law—as a tool, his supreme tool—to maintain the order
he wanted. The law was above men, to be sure, but not
above the One Man.
In its beginnings, possibly, in the fourth century,
Legalist doctrine might have been more accommodating to the Confucian synthesis on the lines, one might
guess, of Kuan Chung (d. 645) , brilliant chief minister
of Duke Huan of Ch'i, for whom even Confucius had
some good words. Later, perhaps, the Legalists grown
more confident, grew more radical. They aimed not
simply at a change from customary to written law. If
fundamental law embraces custom and constitution,
the Legalists provoked throughout the land a crisis in
fundamental law.
So difficult and disturbing for Confucians were the
problems raised by Legalism that in two thousand years
Chinese political and legal thought was never able to
face them squarely. Succeeding dynasties and governments all profited from and used much of Legalist
advice in government and law. Never did they admit
this. With Han Fei Tzu, openly Legalist literature came
to an end. Aristotle in the Politics can coolly dismiss
the nomoi of Draco: there was nothing worth mentioning in them except the severity of penalties. The change
invoked by Legalism was fundamental.
10
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Notes

'Book of Documents, K'ang Kao. Unless otherwise noted, these
and other early Chinese writings cited in the text can be found in
Sebastian de Grazia, ed., Masters of Chinese Political Thought:
From the Beginnings to the Han Dynasty (New York: Viking
Press, 1973).
See Joseph Needham, The Development of Iron and Steel
Technology in China (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1964).
Others usually linked to the Fa-chia are Shen Pu-hai (d. 337 B.C.),
Shen Tao (d. 275 B.C.), Li Ssu (d. 208 B.C.), chief minister under
King Cheng (later the First Emperor), and as forefather, Kuan
Chung (d. 645).
This information on the resurgence in present-day China of interest in Legalist thought appears in an unpublished travel report by
Professor F.W. Mote entitled "China in 1950 and China in 1974—
Some Superficial Observations on the Changes of a Quartercentury," and cited by kind permission of the author.
This sentence which had a varied usage, probably most commonly
included in the punishment one's father and mother, siblings, and
wife and sons. See A.F.P. Hulsewe, Remnants of Han Law, Vol.
I, Introductory Studies (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1955).
For the continuity in written law of this central strand of traditional
law, see T'ung-tsu Ch'ii, Law and Society in Traditional China
(Paris: Mouton & Co., 1965).
Book of Documents (K'ang kao).
"The figure who seems to have put most emphasis on shu is Shen
Pu-hai [See Herrlee G. Creel, Shen Pu-hai: A Chinese Political
Philosopher of the Fourth Century B.C. (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1974).] while the one who seems to have stressed
shih is Shen Tao [See Paul M. Thompson, The Shen Tzu Fragments (Ph.D. thesis, Seattle: University of Washington, 1970).]
"Little seems to be known of the original claims to legitimacy of the
rulers of Ch'in. In the Age of Warring States (403-221 B.C.) the
ruling house of Ch'in carried the name Ying. Its clan ancestress
was said to have swallowed the egg of a dark bird and given birth to
the progenitors of the Ying. Inscriptions have been found of Ch'in
bronzes, possibly of the seventh century B.C. Professor Cho-yun
[See his Ancient China in Transition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965).] kindly provided the original text of the following
inscription.
"Brilliantly my ancestor received the mandate from T'ien to
dwell in the land settled by Yii. The twelve dukes since that time
are at the side of Ti, the god; duly and reverently they keep the
mandate of T'ien and protect the state of Ch'in in order to let her be
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served by the barbarians and Chinese."
See W. Allyn Rickett, tr., The Kuan Tzu: A Repository of Early
Chinese Thought (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,
1965).
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